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Abstract
According  to  the  International  Rescue  Committee,  as  many  as  3.3 
million people have lost their lives, either in direct fighting or from the out-
break of diseases as a result of the war1. Despite the formation of a two-year 
national transition government, composed of representatives of the former 
Kinshasa regime, the pro-government Mayi Mayi-militias, rebel movements, 
the unarmed political opposition and civil society, the prospects for durable 
peace remain bleak. While intensified ethnic strife between Hema and Lendu 
militias in the resource-rich Ituri province has triggered a massive flow of 
refugees and the creation of a multilateral intervention force in June 2003, the 
Kivu provinces have witnessed renewed fighting between rebel forces of the 
Rwandan-backed RCD-Goma rebel movement and Mayi-Mayi militiamen. 
Even the south-eastern Katanga province has shown signs of evolving insta-
bility: on 8 August 2003, the international relief non-governmental organisa-
tion GOAL reported that six different armed groups were occupying the town 
of Manono, following the ejection of the local RCD-Goma administrator by 
the 8th Brigade, a mysterious group of 150 men claiming to be members of 
the former Kinshasa government’s army2. Unfortunately, the spiral of vio-
lence in Congo’s border regions is not the only source of concern to diplomats 
involved in overseeing the peace process. The dubious track record of some 
of the key members of the national transition government does not inspire 
much confidence in the preparatory work for the country’s first democratic 
elections since independence. Whereas a Belgian court has sentenced vice-
president Jean-Pierre Bemba to one year’s imprisonment for human traffick-
ing, his colleague Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi has also faced a Belgian 
judicial inquiry for his inflammatory statements concerning the DRC’s Tutsi 
population in August 19983. Finally, one of the biggest impediments to the 
Congolese peace process may be the issue of resource trafficking. Accord-
ing to the UN expert panel investigating the illegal exploitation of natural 
resources and other forms of wealth of the DRC, members of the Rwandan 
and Ugandan regime have developed mechanisms to continue the looting of 
diamonds, gold, coltan and timber after the official withdrawal of their troops 
from Congolese territory, as agreed in the Pretoria and Luanda peace accords. 
Previous reports by the Panel contained a detailed account of the multiple 
ways in which a selected group of Rwandan and Ugandan military officers, 
politicians and businessmen have taken advantage of the military presence 
of the Rwandan Patriotic Front and the Ugandan People’s Defence Forces to 
secure their stake in the Congolese mining business.
In the present article, we argue instead that the international war in 
Central Africa can only be understood as an intricate cluster of phenomena. 
The long-term erosion of elite power and finance in some parts of Africa, 
occasioned by a changing geopolitical reality in the continent, has sparked 
divergent responses, ranging from state reconstruction in some countries to 
resistance, criminalisation and war in others. The latter response would ap-
1  ‘Le conflit dans l’ex-Zaire est 
le  plus  meurtrier  depuis  la  sec-
onde  guerre  mondiale’,  Le  Soft, 
27 June 2003.
 
2  Various  press  releases  by  IR-
INNEWS, 12/14/18 August 2003.
 
3  ‘Congo  kent  zijn  vier  nieuwe 
vice-presidenten’,  De  Standaard, 
8 May 2003.
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pear to be most common in weak states with deteriorating infrastructures and 
rich natural resources that are extracted on a small scale by petty producers. 
Indeed, these are the countries that tend to fall prey to military-commercial 
groups and factions engaging in plunder and criminal activity. War and vio-
lence, then, seem to be viable paths and conscious strategies for concealing 
the fact that the elites are enriching themselves. Quite clearly, though, pursu-
ing such a strategy is detrimental to the civilian populations, as it puts them at 
greater risk of death, displacement and hardship. Angola (since 1975), Congo 
(since 1990), Sierra Leone, Rwanda (since 1990) and Somalia have all been 
experiencing prolonged wars or internal strife. This would seem to give cre-
dence to the assertion that natural riches are a curse rather than a blessing. 
The above argument also runs against the deep-rooted conviction that 
Africa’s underdevelopment is a consequence of the international economic en-
vironment and globalisation processes. We submit that Africa is being stran-
gled by a lack of serious foreign investment rather than by a new scramble for 
the continent’s natural resources. IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-07 • 7
 Introduction
Africa has experienced its first international war. According to the         
International Rescue Committee, as many as 3.3 million people have lost 
their lives, either in direct fighting or from the outbreak of diseases as a result 
of the war4. The question arises why the incidence of warfare and violence 
has increased in the last decade. An important, albeit partial, explanation lies 
in the altered world-system after the demise of the Soviet Union. Wallerstein 
asserted immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall that, with the end of 
the Cold War, violence and international warfare would change in nature, 
because ‘the emperor (the US or capitalist hegemony) stood naked after he 
lost his figleaf (of the communist countries)’ [Wallerstein 1989: 3]. In other 
words, he foresaw that the end of East-West competition would open new are-
nas of threats to peace. In his almost prophetic analysis, Wallerstein predicted 
that violence and conflict would proliferate because underdevelopment and 
economic regress could no longer be imputed to supposedly inappropriate 
policies.
However, as the same international environment of globalisation can 
apparently lead to very different outcomes in this new world-system, the geo-
political angle needs to be complemented with other explanatory factors. Is 
it a coincidence, for example, that most new violent conflicts arise in Africa, 
where economic regress has been particularly strong? As Bayart has strongly 
argued, the response of African elites to the loss of control of the economic 
rent and consequently of their political grip after the cold war, was different 
and varied from (loss of) control over democratic change to new forms of 
authoritarianism and even to warfare. (Bayart, 2000). According to William 
Reno, the political leaders of failed African states have tried to cope with the 
threat posed by the fragmentation of their former networks of patronage in 
the post-Cold War era by forming alliances with foreign mining companies 
and private security firms. By doing this, African rulers avoided the emer-
gence of local and competing power centres, but, at the same time, they were 
also responsible for destroying their own conventional state structures5. 
This chapter is divided into two parts. First, a macro analysis will be 
undertaken of the Rwandan and Ugandan involvement in the so-called Sec-
ond Congo war, which started in August 1998. We shall consider whether 
this war was a product of Africa’s new geopolitical role in the post-Cold War 
world-system. From the perspective of Huntington’s thesis of the “Clash of 
Civilisations”, one could argue that the strong support from the US and Brit-
ain for the invaders from Uganda and Rwanda was aimed entirely at reinforc-
ing the regional agents of US hegemony over the growing influence of Islamic 
fundamentalism (cf. Sudan). However, the growing rivalry between the new 
leaders of Uganda and Rwanda would appear to contradict this rather radical 
and simplistic thesis. The supporters of the so-called ‘greed’ paradigm are 
convinced that the recent war in the DRC has been more resource-driven than 
geo-politically motivated. In their opinion, the main reason for the persistence 
4  ‘Le conflit dans l’ex-Zaire est 
le  plus  meurtrier  depuis  la  sec-
onde  guerre  mondiale’,  Le  Soft, 
27 June 2003. 
5  ‘African weak states and com-
mercial alliances’, in: African Af-
fairs, vol. 96, (1997): pp. 165-185
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of the conflict lies in the availability of lootable resources such as diamonds, 
gold, coltan and timber, allowing a select group of businessmen, politicians 
and high level military officials to enrich themselves. Yet, as Karen Ballentine 
has rightly pointed out, it is absolutely essential to look beyond the economic 
motivation of the belligerents. While Congo features a high level of primary 
commodity dependence and is therefore at a high risk of civil conflict, the war 
in the DRC should also be seen as the outcome of decades of political misrule 
and corruption by the state elite, aggravated by socio-economic deterioration 
and institutional decay6. We shall argue that history never repeats itself, but 
rather is a continuous amalgam of present and past that constantly produces 
new and unforeseen realities. In the beginning of our macro analysis, we 
will formulate a critique of the definition of ‘illegality’ as proposed by the 
UN Panel on “Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of 
Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo” and replacing it with the less 
problematic economic concept of ‘plunder’. Subsequently, we shall estimate 
the extent of plunder and its significance to the funding of the war. 
In the second section, we will attempt to illustrate the general observa-
tions of the macro analysis by taking a closer look at the coltan commodity 
chain. This micro-analysis will not be limited to the war period, but will also 
cover part of the current political transition phase, which started in July 2003. 
The commodity chain analysis will necessitate the identification of power re-
lations, governance structures and exchange relationships within commercial 
networks7. 
1.  Regress, war, plunder and the involvement of
  Rwanda and Uganda.
    At the end of the Mobutu regime (1997), Zaire had become a gi-
ant on clay feet, so that any exterior or interior enemy could wage war with 
little risk. The eastern part of the country was no longer under Kinshasa’s 
military control, so that it soon became a safe haven for Rwandan refugees 
who had fled the new Tutsi regime in Kigali. Furthermore, the region had be-
come a stronghold for rebel groups who were fighting the regimes in Rwanda, 
Burundi and Uganda. But the area was also attractive for other reasons: un-
like in the densely populated neighbouring countries of Rwanda and Burundi, 
fertile land was abundant in eastern Congo. Moreover, the region possessed 
(new) mineral wealth, including diamonds, gold, coltan and timber. The scene 
was set for the ‘First African World War’, as Susan Rice, the former US As-
sistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, termed the conflict that started 
on 4 August 1998 and that would lead to immense human suffering and a 
devastating death toll. 
In 1997, Zaire’s armed opposition found direct military support in 
Rwanda and Uganda to overthrow the Mobutu regime. Laurent Désiré Kabila, 
the self-pronounced political heir of Patrice Lumumba with a long-standing 
7  ‘Power,  livelihoods  and  con-
flict:  case  studies  in  political 
economy analysis for humanitar-
ian action’, Sarah Collinson (ed.), 
Overseas  Development  Institute 
/  Humanitarian  Policy  Group, 
2003: p. 14. 
6  ‘The  political  economy  of 
armed conflict: beyond greed and 
grievance’,  Karen  Ballentine  & 
Jake Sherman (eds.), (2003): pp. 
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record of armed opposition and dubious economic activity, led the mili-
tary campaign and eventually entered the capital Kinshasa triumphantly 
in May 1997. Kabila’s army was, however, controlled by Rwandan of-
ficers, and when he tried to regain full military autonomy by sending 
the latter home, he was challenged by a Rwandan-and Ugandan-backed 
rebellion, which started in August 1998. Rwanda and Uganda initially 
denied having invaded Congo, but as their involvement in the conflict be-
came all too obvious, they eventually admitted their part. Kabila, mean-
while, had succeeded in mobilising Angolan and Zimbabwean military 
support, a move that effectively divided the country: the west and the 
south were now controlled by the government and its allies (Zimbabwe, 
Angola and Namibia), while the north and the east were held by the rebel 
forces led by Rwanda and Uganda.
Officially, Uganda and Rwanda justified their interventions by ar-
guing that they needed to secure their national borders. However, the fact 
remains that they invaded and occupied a region that was over a thousand 
kilometres away from their own national territory. One can therefore as-
sume that there was a hidden agenda. A first possible motive for invasion 
was territorial expansion, even though this was always going to be hard 
to achieve, given that the invaders faced strong national feeling among 
locals. Moreover, there is an international consensus on the inviolability 
of borders, even if they have been artificially created, as is the case in 
Africa. Border violation may, after all, create a domino effect of conflict 
and war. Still, expansionism cannot be ruled out as a motive. Allegations 
of expansionism have, for that matter, been aimed more at Rwanda than 
at Uganda. Not only has Rwanda’s tough military occupation continued, 
it has actually been expanded, so that the invaders now control a third of 
Congo’s territory. Furthermore, the Rwandan currency has been forcibly 
introduced in the occupation zone, despite the Pretoria Agreement of 
July 2002 between presidents Kabila and Kagame8.
A second hidden motive for war may have been that war generates 
the right conditions for a military-commercial class to enrich itself. After 
all, as war is typically a period of covert and illicit economic activity, it 
creates an exceptional opportunity for predation. It would therefore ap-
pear that plunder, at a terrible social cost for the local population, is an 
underlying drive for continuing the war. A further indication that this is 
indeed the case is the fact that, in August 1999, the invading Ugandan 
and Rwandan armies fought each for control of Kisangani, Congo’s third 
city and now its second diamond and gold centre. 
There is also a deep-rooted belief in the African collective con-
sciousness that this war was brokered behind the scenes by international 
capitalist powers in a ploy to gain control of Congo’s mineral riches. Ac-
cording to this view, Rwanda and Uganda are merely being used as inter-
ested intermediaries. A commentator similarly writes about the involve-
8  The Pretoria Agreement between the 
two  belligerent  countries  was  largely 
due to the efforts of UN Secretary Gen-
eral Kofi Annan and President Mbeki. 
However, many doubts remain regard-
ing  the  implementation  of  this  agree-
ment that, in principle at least, would 
end the war in the DRCongo. 10 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-07 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-07 • 11
ment of Zimbabwe in the DRCongo that ‘it must be realised that South Africa, 
which has been used as a conduit of Western commercial interests in the DRC, 
has all along been waiting in the wings to dictate terms to the DRC factions’ 
[Sunday Mail, 18/8/2002:9]. However, these ideas are expressed not only in 
the press and in radical political essays, but also in learned journals [Dena 
Montague, 2002:103-118]. The fact that the US and the UK have remained 
uncritical of the Rwandan and Ugandan presidents is seen as confirmation 
of the hypothesis of a ‘second scramble for Africa’. Further proof is found 
in the fact that the US and UK are importing mineral ores from Rwanda and 
Uganda, even though Uganda has no coltan reserves of its own [Dena Mon-
tague, 2002: 115]. The allegations and rumours of plunder of Congo’s mineral 
resources ultimately led to the commissioning of a UN Panel to establish 
whether depredation was occurring and, if it was, whether it was in any way 
related to the financing of the war. 
Before we scrutinise the relevance of the above motivations and theses, 
we shall first consider the definition of the “illegal exploitation of natural 
resources and other forms of wealth” developed in the first report of the UN 
Panel of Experts, published in April 2001.  [UN Panel, 2001:2]. Subsequently, 
on the basis of the proposed redefinition and calculations, and an analysis 
of the commodity chain for coltan, we shall revisit these theses and motiva-
tions.
1.1.  On the problematic definition of illegal exports
    The main objective of the UN panel was ‘to research and ana-
lyse the links between the illegal exploitation of the natural resources ...and 
the continuation of the conflict’ [UN Panel, 2001:3]. The panel’s analysis in 
preparation for its first report was based largely on a juridical definition of 
the term ‘illegality’. It asserted that ‘the understanding of illegality is under-
pinned by four elements all related to the rule of law, namely: (a) Violation of 
sovereignty...(b) Respect by actors of the existing regulatory framework ...(c) 
The discrepancy between widely accepted practices in trade and business and 
the way business is conducted...This includes forced monopoly in trading, the 
unilateral fixing of prices of products by the buyer...(d) The violation of in-
ternational law...’[UN Panel, 2001:5]. In our opinion, however, this definition 
is flawed and the starting point may therefore be called into question. First, 
it should be noted that the legitimacy of the government in Kinshasa came 
out of the barrel of a gun rather than elections. Second, the leading political 
movement in Kinshasa, the ‘Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation 
of Congo-Zaire’ (AFDL), which was headed by the late president L. Kabila, 
behaved as if it was governing the country under a one-party system. As a 
result, it was contested by rebel factions as well as by the country’s internal 
political opposition. 
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between widely accepted practices in trade and current praxis) already ap-
plied to Congo under President Kabila before the invasion. Kabila installed 
a monopoly on diamond trading, he used an extremely overvalued exchange 
rate in order to lay hands on scarce forex, and he arranged onerous business 
deals between himself or his firm (Comiex) and the Zimbabwean military 
leadership [Marysse, 1999: 312]. 
In fact, all actors have used similar procedures to finance the war in 
Central Africa, so that any definition of illegal exports and exploitation hing-
ing on the notion of ‘legitimacy’ is problematic. However, that is not to say 
that the UN panel’s work has been pointless. Quite the contrary in fact: with-
out an official UN mandate, it would have been impossible for researchers to 
gather such interesting and detailed material to demonstrate how war leads to 
unacceptable economic practices and imposes suffering that could otherwise 
have been avoided. 
Nevertheless, we feel that, in order to prove the link between illegal 
exports and the financing of the war, it is useful to adopt a different starting 
point. Indeed, what needs to be proven is that economic transactions such 
as the production and exports of diamonds, coltan, gold and timber generate 
added value for those who are directly or indirectly commanding the war. 
The fact that exports leave the country via Kampala and Kigali is, in itself, 
not proof of illegal exploitation of resources. Merchandise exports in eastern 
Congo naturally proceed via these trade routes, irrespective of whether it is 
wartime or peacetime. We argue that the problem lies not so much in the ille-
gal exportation of goods, but in the control and theft of part of the added value 
that in peacetime would benefit Congo and the Congolese. After all, if eco-
nomic surplus is directly or indirectly acquired by warlords, then there is in-
evitably a link between economic activity and warfare. Therefore, we propose 
another term, namely ‘plunder’, which we define as follows: there is plunder if 
an economic resource, after deduction of the added value that is spent in the 
country, leaves the country without compensation through the importation of 
goods or money [Marysse and André, 2001:314]. In this respect, the data from 
the UN Panel show that the warring stakeholders steal profits and impose ad-
hoc ‘taxes’, which consequently do not benefit the Congolese. What the panel 
does not do is determine how large a portion is withheld by the military-com-
mercial class. Nor does it tell us how much is invested in the continuation of 
the war and how much disappears into the pockets of the ‘stakeholders’, be 
it military personnel or (international) traders. On the basis of this definition, 
and using data from the panel as well as our own data, we shall make a rough 
estimate of the extent of plunder, and its relative economic significance to 
the occupying countries. Finally, we shall further refine out methodology by 
means of a case study of the coltan trade.  12 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-07 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-07 • 13
1.2.  Plunder and illegal exports in wartime and peacetime
    Plunder of mineral resources as defined above is, of course, not 
restricted to war situations. Indeed, it was already occurring in Zaire/Congo 
before the war. If a class or group of people possesses discretionary powers 
without accountability to a third party, this class or group can easily enrich it-
self to the detriment of others. As the following table illustrates, Zaire/Congo 
was a case in point.
  Table 1: Trade Balance of DRCongo and Fraudulent Exports   
  of Diamond (in mln. USD)
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Exports 1,562 1,546 1,448 1,442 749 685
Official diamond exports 331 347 341 399 237 200
Fraudulent diamond exports 400 417 411 480 284 239
Diamond exports as a percentage of overall exports 47% 49% 51% 60% 69% 64%
Imports 870 1,089 769 1,102 568 596
Balance 692 457 697 320 180 89
Source: Banque  Nationale Congolaise, condensé de statistiques, différents numéros, Kinshasa, 2000-
5/2001.
The table demonstrates that the Zairian/Congolese State was already 
weakened before the war. The National Bank of Congo estimates that diamond 
smuggling was as large as official diamond exports. We have shown else-
where that, if anything, this is an underestimation of the extent of smuggling 
that was going on: the amount of Congolese diamonds entering Antwerp, a 
global diamond trading centre, is already twice as large as Congo’s total legal 
diamond exports. What the table does not show is that anti-smuggling checks 
in Congo are not very watertight, because the diamond-smuggling rings are 
often controlled by high-ranking officials. This is an example of what Bayart 
calls the ‘rhizome state’, whereby power extends informally from the official 
state to non-state areas, often circumventing the law. This ‘criminalisation’ of 
the state did not start with the invasion by Uganda and Rwanda, though the 
situation has perhaps been aggravated. First, as Table 2 shows, diamond pro-
duction and smuggling declined during the war years 1999 and 2000. How-
ever, as the occupied territories do not report exports, it would appear that 
the plunder continued, albeit to the benefit of a different military-commercial 
group. Second, Table 3 suggests that the occupation has been quite ruthless. 
Indeed, not only are the benefits of the plunder flowing to the Rwandan-Ugan-
dan military and commercial class, who have links with international trading 
houses, but the scale of plunder has been increased significantly. The plunder 
by these two neighbouring countries now exceeds the total revenue of the 
Congolese State. The extent of direct or indirect support from the US and the 
Bretton Woods institutions for Rwanda and Uganda, both of which have full 
access to international financial flows, is known. Both countries have, for that 
matter, been admitted to the HIPC debt reduction programme. This interna-
tional support also suggests that, although Africa is increasingly run by the 
Africans and although the likelihood of direct military intervention by the 12 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-07 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-07 • 13
hegemonic powers has become smaller, the latter do continue to play a role in 
the shaping and directing of wars and conflict on the continent. 
Table 2.  Declared and Non-declared Mineral Exports by Rwanda and  
    Uganda
In mln.USD RWANDA UGANDA
1999 2000 1999 2000
DIAMOND
Official Exports 0.4 1.8 1.8 1.3
Non-declared diamond exports for
Rwanda and reexports by Uganda
40 40 1.8 1.3
GOLD1
Official exports 0.1 0.1 95.0 89.9
Non-declared gold exports *Rwanda
and reexports Uganda
29 29 95.0 89.9
COLTAN
Official Exports 24 16.6 13.9 -
Non-declared coltan exports* 240 240 13.9 -
Total declared exports of minerals2 61.2 68.4 438.8 380.5
Total exports declared and non-declared 309 309 110.7 91.2
    In % of declared exports. 505% 452% 25% 24%
Total value added of plundered
diamond, gold and coltan
119 119 61.1 45.3
    In % of GDP3 6.1% 5.2% 1.1% 0.8%
    In % of military expenses4 146% 137% 53% 43%
Sources: [S.Marysse and C.André, 2001:323-327]9
1 we have estimated the value of gold exports by multiplying the reported kilos by the gold price on 30 
April 2001 (8,300 USD/kilo).
2 IMF, Rwanda Staff Report for the 2000 Article IV Consultation and Requests for the Third Annual Ar-
rangement Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility and for Extension of Commitment Period, 
Washington, IMF, 12 December 2000, p.39; IMF, Uganda. Staff Report for the 2001 Article IV Consulta-
tion, Second Review Under the Third Annual Arrangement Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility and Request for Waiver of Performance Criteria, Washington, IMF, 19 January 2000, p.43.
3 IMF, Uganda Staff Report for the...., op cit., 12 March 2001, p.8, 37.
4 IMF, Uganda Staff Report for the...., op cit., 12 March 2001, p.8, 40.
Several conclusions can be drawn from this table. First, in terms of non-
declared exports, Rwanda had a greater stake in this war than Uganda. Seen 
from this perspective, ending the war would not be beneficial to Rwanda. We 
would like to emphasise at this point that we did not inflate our figures: the 
UN Panel, for example, estimates that the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) 
made at least USD 250 million from coltan sales alone over a period of 18 
months in 1999 and 2000 [UN Panel, 2001:36]. Second, the extent of plunder 
is of course considerably smaller than total non-declared exports, because a 
large proportion of the latter is value added that is spent on the cost of produc-
tion. Third, the added value that would have benefited Congolese traders and 
producers in peacetime is sizeable. Finally, as military spending by Rwanda 
and Uganda was limited as a condition for access to the financial flows pro-
vided by the Bretton Woods institutions, it is now quite clear that wartime 
plunder has helped finance the conflict and has unduly prolonged people’s 
9  On the basis of more recent and 
detailed information on prices in 
each of the stages of the coltan 
commodity  chain,  we  have  re-
vised our estimate of plunder that 
was published in 2001.
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suffering. The ostrich policy of a number of bilateral donors and the Interna-
tional Financial Institutions, characterised by a continuation of funding for 
the invading countries in the knowledge that funds are fungible, has therefore 
indirectly condoned the continuation of war. 
In order to make the mechanism of plunder by a military-commercial 
class more visible, we shall now consider a commodity chain that has been 
extremely important for financing Rwanda’s war effort, especially in 2000 
and 2001: the commodity chain for coltan.  
2.  The commodity chain for coltan10
    The term ‘coltan’ is a contraction of ‘colombo-tantalite’. It is an 
ore containing two rare metals with similar atomic structures: niobium (Nb), 
also known as columbium, and tantalum (Ta).
Coltan is refined through a chemical process whereby the tantalum 
or niobium are separated from the ore and processed into a metal powder. 
There are just a few companies in the world that process coltan, including 
H.C. Starck (Germany), Cabott Inc. (U.S.), Ningxia (China) and Ulba (Kaza-
khstan) (see Chart 2). Tantalum and Niobium powder are in great demand by 
a number of industries. Tantalum powder is used to manufacture highly heat-
resistant electronic components for mobile phones, laptop computers, game 
consoles ...  It is also applied in the aviation and atomic energy industries. 
Niobium, on the other hand, is mostly used in heat-resistant steel and glass 
alloys in the construction industry.
Until recently, the bulk of the world’s tantalum supply came from dis-
card slags from tin smelters. Coltan ore is also often associated with the tin 
mineral cassiterite. Following the gradual decline of the tin industry, new 
sources  have  been  sought.  The  biggest  coltan  mines,  accounting  for  ap-
proximately 60% of world production, are located in Australia. They are the 
Greenbushes and Wodgina mines, owned by Sons of Gwalia Ltd. It is gener-
ally believed that 80% of the world’s reserves are located in Africa, with the 
DRCongo accounting for 80% of these African reserves. In the DRCongo, 
coltan is found near rivers and in riverbeds, and there are also vast natural 
reserves in the east of country, more specifically in the two Kivu provinces 
and in Maniema. 
Towards the end of 2000, the population of Kivu was suddenly dragged 
into an unprecedented coltan rush. In just a few months’ time, the price of 
coltan rose tenfold. In January 2000, an international trader would have paid 
around USD 20 for a kilo of unprocessed coltan ore, but by December 2000, 
the price had peaked at approximately USD 200. This sharp price increase 
was caused by an overvaluation of the technology market, which was in turn 
triggered by the introduction of a new generation of mobile phones (UMTS) 
and a craze for game consoles (e.g. Sony Playstation II). 
10 For  a  more  extensive  survey 
of this topic, see the two sources 
on which much of this section is 
based. The first in-depth analysis 
of  the  importance  of  coltan  for 
the Kivu by a close observer of 
the region for over 20 years, see 
Didier  de  Failly  ‘Coltan:  pour 
comprendre...’  in  S.  Marysse 
and  F.  Reyntjens,  L’Afrique  des 
Grands  Lacs:  annuaire  2000-
2001,  Harmattan,  Paris,  pp.279-
306.  For  an  account  of  western 
involvement  in  the  coltan  trade, 
see J. Cuvelier and T. Raeymaek-
ers,  ‘European  companies  and 
the  coltan  trade:  supporting  the 
war economy in the DRC’, IPIS 
International  Peace  Information 
Service, Antwerp, January 2002 
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2.1.  The coltan boom and the creation of the Société Minière
  des Grands Lacs (SOMIGL)
    It did not take the RCD-Goma rebel movement very long to cash 
in on the sudden demand for tantalum powder on the world market. On 25 
November 2000, it imposed a strict monopoly on coltan buying and selling, 
granting the control on the new system to the Société Minière des Grands 
Lacs (SOMIGL). The woman in charge of SOMIGL was Aziza Kulsum, also 
known as Madame Gulamali11.   
According to Nestor Kiyimbi, the Chief of Department for land and 
mining affairs for the RCD-Goma rebel movement, the reasons for granting 
the monopoly on all coltan exports to the Société Minière des Grands Lacs 
were threefold: first, it was believed that the Shenimed trading post - owned 
by Madame Gulamali - was the only trading post that had actually managed, 
for a considerable period of time, to reach the minimum level of 5 tonnes of 
taxable coltan exports a month; second, the rebel authorities were dissatisfied 
with the fraudulent undervaluation practices of a large number of Congolese 
comptoirs; and third, they were also alarmed by the high rates of illegally 
smuggled minerals12. 
It is very unlikely that the creation of the Société Minière des Grands 
Lacs took place without the complicity of RCD-Goma’s biggest supporter, the 
Rwandan regime. In fact, one of the persistent rumours about the Rwandan 
involvement in the Congolese coltan trade is that Patrick Karegeya, the per-
sonal security advisor of Rwandan President Paul Kagame and the head of 
Rwanda’s external security service13, has played an important role behind the 
screens during the preparatory stages of the implementation of the SOMIGL 
monopoly14. Moreover, in his testimony before the Commission of Inquiry 
on the Great Lakes of the Belgian Senate, Deus Kagiraneza, a former senior 
intelligence officer, asserted that Madame Gulamali has closely collaborated 
with the Rwandan regime and has even been personally involved in the physi-
cal elimination of military officials stationed in the DRC15. According to the 
UN Panel, a Congo-desk was created within the Department of External Re-
lations of the RPA to oversee the mining of Congolese resources and facilitate 
contacts with Western clients. This procedure can be seen as a clear example 
of ‘military commercialism’, a concept developed by Christian Dietrich to de-
scribe the way in which military officials set up corporate-military businesses 
to generate income for themselves and their politico-military apparatus16. 
Two companies that played a key role in the organization of the busi-
ness activities of the Rwandan Patriotic Front are Rwanda Metals (RM) and 
Grands Lacs Metals (GLM). While Rwanda Metals’ former director is Fran-
cis Karimba, the shareholders of Grands Lacs Metals reportedly included 
Majors Gatete, Dan and Kazura17.  There can be no doubt about the strong 
ties between the Rwandan army and the trading companies ‘Rwanda Metals’ 
and ‘Grands Lacs Metals’. In the first UN report, it was pointed out that some 
11 ‘Making a killing: criminality 
and coping in the Kivu war econ-
omy’,  2002,  Stephen  Jackson, 
in:  Review  of  African  Political 
Economy, nr. 93-94: p. 526. 
12 ‘Le coltan et les populations du 
Nord-Kivu’, February 2001, Pole 
Institute : pp. 15-16. 
13 Interview  with  Rwandan 
source, 3 April 2003. 
14 Confidential report from Con-
golese source in Goma, obtained 
during field trip in the DRC (June 
2003).
15 Testimony  Deus  Kagiran-
eza  before  the  Commission  of 
Inquiry of the Belgian Senate, 1 
March 2002. 
16 ‘Supporting the war economy 
in the DRC: European companies 
and the coltan trade’, IPIS, Janu-
ary 2002. 
17 Report of the UN Panel of Ex-
perts on the Illegal Exploitation 
of Natural Resources in the DR 
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of the letters that were sent to potential clients in Europe and the United States 
had been signed by Dan Munyuza, the then head of the Congo desk18.  
It has been established that, during the coltan boom, one of the privi-
leged business partners of Rwanda Metals and Grands Lacs Metals was the 
Swiss company Finmining, which, according to some sources, may have had 
links with the notorious Russian arms dealer Victor Bout. While Finmining, 
an offshore company registered in the tax haven of Saint-Kitts, successively 
worked through the (conventional) Kigali-based trading post Copimar and 
then through Rwanda Metals, its coltan was unvariably shipped to the Ulba 
Metallurgical Plant in Kazakhstan for further treatment. Reliable sources have 
asserted that from April 2001 onwards, the shipments took place in a separate 
military zone of Kigali airport. Credible information exists that Finmining’s 
shipments to Kazakhstan are handled by Ulba Aviakompania (ULB)/Irtysh 
Avia (IRT), an air freight company operated by the Ulba Processing Plant 
- with headquarters at Ust-Kamenogorsk airport. According to Airline-fleets 
International, a renowned business publication, ULBA and IRTYSH merged 
in 2000 following the privatisation of the national Air Kazakhstan. Today, 
the joint company operates 16 ex-Soviet Yakovlev airplanes and leases Ily-
ushin 18 aircraft from the company AIR CESS-CESSAVIA (CSS) for cargo 
and passenger flights when required. This suggests that Chris Huber and his 
coltan business may be linked to one of Africa’s main arms traffickers. AIR 
CESS has been managed until recently by Viktor Vasilevich Butt, aka Viktor 
Bout. Under investigation by Interpol and a number of Western countries, 
he is often referred to as ‘Victor B’ because he uses at least five aliases and 
different versions of his last name. Today, Bout oversees a complex network 
of over 50 planes, several airline companies, cargo charter companies and 
freight-forwarding companies, many of which are involved in shipping illicit 
cargo. Thanks to this network, Bout has established himself as the world’s 
most famous arms supplier to embargoed state actors such as the Revolution-
ary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone and UNITA rebels in Angola19.
2.2.  Rwandan involvement in the post-SOMIGL era
    Although  the  SOMIGL  monopoly  provided  the  RCD  with 
1.124.970 USD of tax revenues in December 2000, Gulamali eventually could 
not live up to the expectations of the rebel authorities. From the end of 2000 
onwards, coltan prices in the world markets began to fall, bottoming out in 
October 2001 at less than a third of their peak. Simultaneously, SOMIGL’s 
coltan exports steeply dropped from 97.6 tons in January according to RCD, 
to 27 tons in February and to a mere 19 tons in March, according to Africa 
Mining Intelligence. Apart from this change of market conditions, the failure 
of the SOMIGL monopoly was also due to the fact that many established 
Kivutian coltan traders were reluctant to accept the new structure associated 
with the creation of the SOMIGL monopoly. According to the Goma-based 
Pole Institute, the traders were increasingly annoyed and discouraged by the 
18 Report of the UN Panel of Ex-
perts on the Illegal Exploitation 
of Natural Resources in the DR 
Congo, 12 April 2001: §129 
19 ‘Supporting the war economy 
in the DRC: European companies 
and the coltan trade’, IPIS, Janu-
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low profit levels they were able to reach during the monopoly: with coltan 
buying prices between 30 and 60 dollars per kilo according to the mineral 
content, they could buy from miners at 30 dollars a kilo and sell to SOMIGL 
at 33 dollars a kilo, a minimal margin of only three dollars a kilo20. Finally, 
the initiatives of the international community to curb illicit resource traffick-
ing served the death-blow to the SOMIGL monopoly. In their first report on 
the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, published on 12 April 2001,  the UN Panel of 
Experts called for an immediate temporary embargo on the import or export 
of coltan, niobium, pyrochlore, cassiterite, timber, gold and diamonds from 
or to Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda until those countries’ involvement in the 
exploitation of natural resources of the DRC was made clear and declared so 
by the Security Council21. Additionally, the Panel also urged the UN Member 
States to freeze (without delay) the financial assets of the companies or the 
individuals said to be involved in the illicit trafficking of Congo’s natural 
resources22. While the UN report was, undoubtedly, an honest effort to stop 
the foreign involvement in the looting of Congolese resources, the media and 
the western public opinion were not always able (or willing) to distinguish 
between junior companies directly collaborating with the military actors in 
Eastern DRC, and well established entrepreneurs with a longstanding history 
in the DRC. Needless to say, both the hesitation of the UN Member States to 
implement the recommendations of the Panel of Experts and the stigmatising 
attitude of the press and western public opinion seriously reduced the number 
of coltan traders prepared to stay in Eastern DRC (see box).  
20 ‘The coltan phenomenon: how 
a  rare  mineral  has  changed  the 
life of the population of war-torn 
North Kivu province in the East 
of  the  Democratic  Republic  of 
the  Congo’,  January  2002,  Pole 
Institute: pp. 8-9. 
21 UN  Report,  12  April  2001, 
§221  (http://www.un.org/Docs/
sc/letters/2001/357e.pdf)
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Box: Strategies to escape from public scrutiny:
the example of Eagles Wings Resources International (EWRI)
Following  the  publication  of  several  UN  reports  on  the  illegal  exploitation  of  natural 
resources from the Democratic Republic of Congo, the international coltan traders are 
well aware of the necessity to diversify their export routes, in order to escape from public 
scrutiny. This is not a moot point. A recent incident in the port of Dar-es-Salaam, whereby 
Tanzanian authorities intercepted a container holding 36 barrels of presumably Congolese 
coltan23, has shown that the resource issue is very sensitive to the governments of Congo’s 
neighbouring countries, with several of them trying to boost their reputation through drastic 
interventions of their customs authorities.
Until very recently, Eagles Wings Resources International was a joint venture partnership 
between the American company Trinitech and the Dutch company Chemie Pharmacie 
Holland (CPH)24. While CPH took care of the logistical and financial services, Trinitech’s 
package of activities consisted mainly of selling all sorts of tantalum and niobium products 
on the world market.  In November 2000, EWRI founded a new, Luxemburg-registered 
company, in addition to its American and Dutch offices. The aim of this new company 
was probably to enhance EWRI’s investment opportunities and possibly start other holding 
companies in Europe25. 
The example of EWRI serves well to illustrate the strategic decision to diversify the export 
routes for coltan. On the 12th of March 2001 EWRI decided to create its own comptoir in 
Bukavu. Its director was Alfred Rwigema, the brother-in-law of the Rwandan President 
Paul Kagame26. From the moment Rwigema was granted to export coltan from the territory 
controlled by RCD-Goma, at least 88, 533 tons of coltan were shipped to the warehouses of 
Chemie Pharmacie Holland or to the offices of the EWRI joint venture in Kigali. Usually, 
the coltan was transported to Kigali by lorry, passing through the customs office of ‘Ruzizi 
II’.
Date Provenance Estimated value Net weight (kgs) Destinary
27 October 2001 South Kivu 61977,393 USD 7.501,5 CPH
22 November 2001 South Kivu Unknown 8.438, 5 CPH
19 December 2001 South Kivu 121.530,45 USD 12.631, 5 CPH
22 January 2002 South Kivu 148.672, 63 USD 13.167 CPH
1 February 2002 South Kivu 126.049, 95 USD 11.145 CPH
15 February 2002 South Kivu 163.472 USD 10.920 CPH
1 March 2002 South Kivu 111.024 USD 10.810, 5 CPH
3 April 2002 South Kivu 42.592, 4 USD 4.570 CPH
19 August 2002 South Kivu 29776 USD 2910, 5 EWRI/Kigali
28 August 2002 South Kivu Unknown 4755, 5 EWRI/Kigali
9 October 2002 South Kivu 3753 USD 1683 EWRI/Kigali
Subsequently, following the publication of the first UN Report on the illegal exploitation of 
natural resources from the DRC, EWRI decided to shift its core activities to Rwanda, where 
it showed a great interest in the exploration of an artisanal mining site in the prefecture of 
Gitarama. The official start of coltan exploitation in Rwanda gave EWRI the opportunity to 
rid itself from all the allegations and rumours about its involvement in resource exploitation 
in Congolese rebel-held territory. Kigali replaced Bukavu as EWRI’s main buying point 
and Kigali airport was used to fly the coltan directly to the international refining plants. 
According to the UN, approximately 25 per cent of EWRI’s coltan is shipped to the Ulba 
Metallurgical Plant of NAC Kazatomprom (Kazakhstan), while another 25 per cent is sold 
to Trinitech International Inc. in the US. Trinitech arranges for sales to both Ulba and to the 
Chinese processing facility at Ningxia Non-Ferrous Metals Smeltery (NNMG). Fifteen per 
cent of Eagle Wings coltan is bought by HC Starck in Germany27. 
23 According  to  an  article  in 
the  Indian  Ocean  Newsletter, 
the  container’s  shipper  was  the 
Rwanda Metals firm of Kigali, its 
destination  Pacific  Ores  Metals 
and Chemicals Ltd of Hong Kong, 
and  the  mode  of  transport  the 
P&O Nedlloyd Mahe, a ship that 
docked  in  the  harbor  of  Dar-es-
Salaam on October 5th 2002 and 
which was due to sail two days 
later.  Alan  Crawley,  the  British 
owner of Pacific Ores Metals, has 
refuted  allegations  concerning 
the  assumed  Congolese  origin 
of  the  coltan  shipment  (source: 
‘Is coltan trafficking returning ?’, 
19  October  2002,  Indian  Ocean 
Newsletter). . 
24 In an official press statement, 
issued on 11 December 2002, the 
Dutch  Ministry  of  Foreign  Af-
fairs, stated that the commercial 
agreement  between  EWRI  and 
Chemie  Pharmacie  Holland  has 
ceased to exist since March 2002 
(source: ‘Geen aanwijzingen voor 
juistheden  VN-beschuldiging 
tegen  Chemie  Pharmacie  Hol-
land’,  11  December  2002,  http:
//www.minez.nl). 
25 ‘European companies and the 
coltan  trade:  an  update’,  IPIS 
Report, September 2002: p. 13. 
26  According  to  the  Congolese 
commercial  registry,  Rwigema 
has  the  Congolese  national-
ity.  His  official  name  is  Bat-
inya  Rwigema  Aho  (sources:   
Arrêté  départemental  nr.  19/
RCD/CAB/DTME/2001  du  12 
Mars  2001  portant  attribution 
de  l’autorisation  personnelle  de 
prospection nr. 005/DTME/2001 
//  Arrêté  départemental  nr.  24 
/RCD/CE/DTME/2001  du  12 
Avril 2001 portant agrément d’un 
comptoir d’achat et d’exportation 
du coltan. 
27 Final Report of the Panel of Ex-
perts on the illegal exploitation of 
natural resources and other forms 
of wealth of the Democratic Re-
public of the Congo, 16 October 
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Remarkably, the UN Panel of Experts has found evidence that, in one instance, EWRI 
has engaged the Mozambique Gemstone Company to provide false documents establish-
ing Mozambique as the origin of a shipment originating in Rwanda and transiting through 
South Africa. The consignment was sold to the South Africa-based AMC African Trading 
and Consulting Company, which then sold it to H.C. Starck Ltd in Rayong, Thailand, on 
21 September28. 
In sum, this means that EWRI has used two different buying points and at least two different 
export routes to bring the coltan to its clients. While relatively small amounts of the mineral 
were bought by the EWRI comptoir in Bukavu, transported to Kigali and flown to Holland, 
unspecified amounts of coltan were also shipped directly from Kigali, sometimes transiting 
through South Africa. (end of box)
2.3.  The creation of the Congo Holding Development Company
  Several  observers  have  noted  that  the  Rwandan  regime  has  kept 
stakes in the exploitation and the trade of Congolese resources despite the 
recent developments on the battle field and  the diplomatic level. It has been 
reported that the Rwandan government has adopted new strategies for main-
taining mechanisms for revenue generation once the Rwandan army has left 
the DRC29. The economic control mechanisms put in place by Rwanda pre-
sumably include the replacement of Congolese directors of parastatals with 
businessmen from Kigali to guarantee the sustained control over the revenues 
obtained from water, power and transportation facilities, and the replacement 
of local currency with Rwandan currency. On the military level, there have 
been several initiatives to ensure the continued presence of Rwandan troops 
on Congolese territory, for instance by obtaining a large number of Congolese 
passports in order to give another identity to the RPA officers located at stra-
tegically important sites in the DRC30. 
In the coltan trade, a crucial development has been the creation of the 
Congo Holding Development Company, in the autumn of 2001. One of the 
key figures involved in this new deal - which came down to granting all the 
concessions of the former Société Minière du Kivu to one single enterprise 
- was Gertrude Kitembo, one of the founding members of the original RCD 
rebel movement and currently the Minister of Post and Telecommunication in 
the Congolese transition government. Kitembo started her career as the head 
of RCD’s agriculture and rural development department31, and obtained her 
first big promotion, when on 14 April 2000, she was appointed Governor of 
the Maniema Province. Apparently, her appointment was part of a joint effort 
of the leadership of the RCD-Goma rebel movement and their foreign backers 
of the Rwandan army to prevent new eruptions of dissidence in the East32. 
Perhaps illustrative of Kitembo’s close relationship with the inner cir-
cle of the rebel movement was the fact that, shortly after her appointment as 
the new Governor of the Maniema province, the RCD-Goma leadership an-
nounced that provincial governors would also be provincial presidents of the 
28 Ibidem, § 81. 
29 Final Report of the Panel of Ex-
perts on the illegal exploitation of 
natural resources and other forms 
of  wealth  of  the  DRC  (S/2002/
1146): §13.
 
30 Ibidem: §15. 
31 Source:  http://
www.sas.upenn.edu/African_
Studies/Hornet/irin7299.html: 
‘DRC  :  population  left  alone  to 
cope with the effects of the war’. 
32 Along with Kitembo, Kasongo 
Olango  was  nominated  as  Dep-
uty-Governor  in  charge  of  the 
Economy and Finance, while Al-
bert Shindano was put in charge 
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RCD33. There are indications that Kitembo’s political aspirations are far from 
over. When Etienne Tshisekedi, the long-time president of the Congolese op-
position party UDPS and former prime minister of several Mobutu govern-
ments, decided to forge an alliance with RCD-Goma in order to improve his 
chances of becoming Congo’s next president, Kitembo immediately stepped 
in and joined the alliance as the ‘national secretary for women’s affairs’34. In 
the new Congolese transition government, which was set up under a peace 
pact signed in December 2002 and officially installed on 17 July 2003, Ger-
trude Kitembo holds the portfolio of postal services and telecommunication. 
In the light of the rumours about the persistent involvement of mem-
bers of the Rwandan regime in the looting of Congolese resources, it is highly 
remarkable that Wa Ngera Rukangira, Gertrude Kitembo’s husband, sits on 
two special advisory boards informing President Paul Kagame on issues 
relating  to  public  health  and  social  security.  Nonetheless,  Rukangira  has 
asserted that he has nothing to do with his wife’s political activities. Accord-
ing to Rukangira, the only reason why he was invited to become one of the 
presidential advisors as that he had previously built up a strong reputation as 
a researcher for the World Health Organisation. As a holder of both a Congo-
lese and a Rwandan passport, Rukangira claims to spend most of his time in 
Kigali, where he is the head of Clean House Limited, a company specialised 
in the development of insecticides and anti-malaria medication35. 
For the time being, very little is known about the identity of the Congo 
Holding Development Company’s Rwandan trading partners and their con-
nections to the Rwandan military and/or other officials of the Rwandan regime. 
However, judging by a number of contracts gathered by the authors during a 
recent field trip in the DRC (June 2003), most of the refining of the minerals 
takes place in Gisenyi, where a new processing plant has been constructed 
by a group of South African investors. There is a lot of resentment among 
Kivutian coltan traders about the decision of the South African funders set up 
a processing facility just across the Congolese border, as it inevitably means 
that most of the added value disappears into foreign pockets without any new 
investment being made in the Congolese economy. 
The creation of the Congo Holding Development Company has also 
marked a new trend in resource exploitation in the Congolese war context: 
instead of focussing mainly and almost uniquely on the coltan trade, foreign 
trading companies now seem to divide their attention over different spheres 
of the Congolese economy. There is documented evidence that the Congo 
Holding Development Company also holds a dominant position in the export 
of gold, cassiterite and diamonds from Congolese territory. 
In this respect, reference should be made to a provisional agreement 
between the Congo Holding Development Company and the Kigali-based 
Explore Trade Commerce Limited, signed in Goma on September 1st 2001. 
Whereas the CHDC agrees to offer its partner all the facilities associated 
33 http://www.web.net/~iccaf/
hu ma n r ig ht s /congoi n fo /
marnewsapril00.htm:  “Division 
and resistance in the East”. 
34 Source:  http:
//w w w.le sof t on l i ne.net /
Info023.html.
 
35 Telephone interview Wa Ngera 
Rukangira, 4 November 2002. 20 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-07 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-07 • 21
with the ownership of a large number of mining concessions and its licence to 
keep a diamond comptoir in the territory controlled by the RCD, the Rwandan 
company promises to bring in its technical expertise and to assume responsi-
bility for the diamond sales abroad. The two parties agree to split the profits 
on a 50/50 per cent basis36. 
Although the UN has repeatedly condemned Rwandan exports of Con-
golese conflict diamonds, it is possible that some of the Congolese diamonds 
bought by Explore Trade Commerce Limited eventually end up in and are 
sold by legal commercial circuits. The managing director of Explore Trade 
Commerce Limited used to be the business manager of an Antwerp-based 
diamond company. 
 
2.4.  A tentative assessment of the distribution of the added value  
    between the different stakeholders in the coltan commodity  
    chain
    For various reasons, it is impossible to determine precisely how 
much of the added value goes to each stakeholder in the coltan commodity 
chain. First, prices are not published on the London Metal Exchange. Moreo-
ver, the price paid by international traders is expressed in dollars per pound of 
tantalum pentoxide contained [www.tanb.org], which varies from extraction 
site to extraction site. Many sources give different prices even for the same 
period, mainly because they confuse tantalum prices with the price of coltan, 
which is determined by the coltan’s tantalum content [BBC, 1 August 2002 
and ABCNews.com, 21 jan.2001]. 
Thus, in our reconstruction of the coltan trade, we must rely entirely 
on information from the field and from traders in order to determine the ap-
proximate value added that is going to the warring parties, and this can lead to 
skewed results. It seems useful to make a distinction between the distribution 
during the SOMIGL period and the distribution in the period after SOMIGL’s 
abolishment. Given the possibly large margins of error, due to the secrecy 
surrounding the illegal exports of mineral wealth and natural resources, the 
focus of our analysis will be on those points in the coltan commodity chain 
where added value is disappearing. An overview of the various stakeholders 
in this commodity chain is given in chart 2. 
According to UN estimates, during the year 2000 the RPA exported at 
least 100 tonnes of coltan a month through the Rwandan capital Kigali. If we 
follow UN figures, the RPA would have made 20 million USD a month by 
selling coltan through its allied trading posts to international traders. Includ-
ing transport and other external costs, this would have amounted to at least 
250 million USD in a period of 18 months (from late 1999 until mid-2001). 
This, according to the UN, is “substantial enough to finance a war”37. Accord-
ing another, well-informed source, between 60 and 70 percent of these profits 
36 Preliminary  agreement  be-
tween the Congo Holding Devel-
opment  Company  and  Explore 
Trade Commerce Limited, Goma, 
1 September 2001.
 
37 Report of the UN Panel of Ex-
perts on the Illegal Exploitation 
of Natural Resources in the DR 
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are re-invested in the war38. However, evidence from selling contracts for 
this period suggests that UN figures are probably exaggerated. A more likely 
figure would be 64 million USD, excluding all external costs and taking the 
highest average prices. If we take an average price of 10 USD/kg to purchase 
the coltan from local miners, the actual profit for the RPA for this period has 
been no more than 40 million USD39. This figure also relates to the official 
exports from Rwanda for the year 2001. That year, Rwanda exported 44 mil-
lion USD worth of coltan, according to official figures40. 
The revenues of the other stakeholders in the coltan commodity chain 
were lower than those allegedly accruing to the RPA. Most coltan digging 
was carried out ‘informally’ by groups of five to six mostly young people led 
by someone who has the expertise to detect coltan sites. During the SOMIGL-
era, they were left with a weekly income of 30 USD -if prices were high- and 
5 USD if prices were low: it can be assumed that a successful group was ca-
pable of extracting about five to six kilos of unprocessed ore in a week and it 
should be taken into account that half of the yield from extraction went to the 
leader of the group, the landowners and towards certain taxes. While these 
were not high wages, the pay was better than that offered by many alterna-
tive livelihoods, which largely explains the rush for coltan [de Failly , 2001:
297]. There was, however, an important exception to the rule that most coltan 
production was the work of informal petty producers during the SOMIGL-
period. The coltan mines of Punia, Walikale and Numbi in Kivu province, all 
of which are known for their high tantalum content, were controlled directly 
by the RPA. Here, Rwandan prisoners performed a kind of forced labour for 
subsistence. From these sites, the coltan was transported immediately to Ki-
gali, from where it was exported by an army-controlled trader. Needless to 
say that the extent of plunder was maximal in this RPA-controlled trade. Un-
fortunately, we have no data on the quantities involved [de Failly, 2001:295]. 
In any case, during the SOMIGL-period, most coltan was dug by petty 
producers. They constituted the first link in a very long chain up to the trad-
ing posts or ‘comptoirs ‘in the main trading centres of the region, particularly 
Bukavu and Goma. In the first phase, the coltan was put in 30-kilo bags and 
transported on foot for between twenty to thirty kilometres to a local trading 
centre. Here, some preliminary refining took place, after which the coltan 
was weighed and its tantalum content estimated. Needless to say that agents 
of the controlling rebel groups closely monitored and taxed each stage in the 
commodity chain. Subsequently, the local traders transported the coltan to 
the regional and accredited ‘comptoirs’ to whom they sold. These comptoirs, 
predictably, needed to buy a licence from the new political class, except for 
those who were entirely controlled by the Rwandan army, such as Rwanda 
Metals and Grands Lacs Metals. They further refined the coltan and, through 
laboratory testing, determined the exact tantalum content of the coltan ore. 
In the case of the Rwanda-controlled comptoirs, analyses are carried out in 
Kigali or even in Europe. 
38 Marc  Hoogsteyns,  journalist, 
hearing  before  the  Belgian  Sen-
ate, 17 May 2002.
39 The UN Panel uses for its esti-
mates an average selling price of 
200 USD/kg unprocessed coltan 
to  international  traders.  Selling 
contracts  between  local  and  in-
ternational  traders  for  the  same 
period portray a price which lays 
at  one  tenth  to  one  fifth  of  the 
UN estimate: between 20 and 40 
USD/kg  for  unprocessed  coltan 
ore.  Prices  for  tantalum  (not 
coltan) for the same year ranged 
between 40 in January and 400 
USD in December 2000.
40 published in The East African, 
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The ‘comptoirs’ sold the material to international traders who ordered 
amounts and offered prices in accordance with what they expected to make 
on the international market. It is probably in this section of the chain that most 
of the value added was realised, i.e. the difference between the prices that the 
international traders pay (or claim to pay) to the comptoirs and what they get 
from the tantalum processing plants. We reached this conclusion on the basis 
of interviews with several independent traders in Europe and the striking 
observation that almost the entire proceeds that the comptoirs received from 
these traders, i.e. the price that was faxed to them, went to covering the costs 
of the various stages in the local commodity chain. So apart from tax rev-
enues of almost 20% and the part of production that was directly or indirectly 
controlled by the RPA, the value added was realised elsewhere.
Our hypothesis, based on business practice in the sector, is the follow-
ing. The four big Tantalum processing plants usually entered into long-term 
contracts with large mining companies (see supra), not with informal diggers 
and ‘comptoirs ‘in the DRCongo. These contracts stipulated the quantities 
that needed to be supplied, while the price was determined by the market. 
Consequently, the price paid under long-term contracts could be twice as 
high as that paid to the comptoirs by international traders. This was the case, 
for example, when prices suddenly increased due to the technological hype 
in 2000. Therefore, most of the value added was realised by traders who sold 
on the spot market to the big processing companies. This rent may then have 
been shared with the regional traders through underinvoicing or other ac-
counting techniques. However, it should be stressed that, so far, we have been 
unable to obtain hard evidence for these assertions. 
It is probably safe to say that, in the post-SOMIGL period, the Rwan-
dan involvement in the trade of coltan originating from the Democratic Re-
public of Congo has significantly diminished as a result of the spectacular 
price drops for tantalum on the world market and several initiatives by the 
international community to curb the trafficking of Congolese resources. Nev-
ertheless, mechanisms seem to have been developed by members of the RPA 
and the Rwandan regime to allow for the continued looting of various Congo-
lese minerals. While it is unclear to what extent the Rwandan government and 
the Rwandan army have been involved in the creation of the Congo Holding 
Development, it can certainly be argued that the establishment of this new 
company has led to a further drain of added value to Rwanda. 24 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-07 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-07 • 25
Chart 1:  Coltan: From the Congolese War Zones to the Mobile Phone
Sources: see J.Cuvelier and T.Raeymaekers, ‘European companies and the coltan trade: supporting 
the war economy in the DRC’, IPIS International Peace Information Service, Antwerp, January 2002 :
10 ; Kristi Essick, ‘A call to arms’, The Industry Standard Magazine, 11/6/01; E. Bruyland, ‘Bloed aan 
uw GSM?’, Trends, 19/4/01; Tantalum-Niobium International Study Center (www.tanb.org); Didier de 
Failly, “Coltan, pour comprendre...”, in L’Annuaire des Grands Lacs, Antwerp, November 2001
Does the assertion that most value added is probably realised by interna-
tional traders, and is not injected back into the Congolese economy, tie in with 
the hypothesis that war is being waged to foster the interests of international 
capital, with the Rwandan and Ugandan regimes serving as a local smoke-
screen? It is certainly true that some international and regional traders (be it 
commercial or military) have benefited from the coltan rush and reaped most 
of the windfall profits. However, to the global tantalum processing industry, 
Eastern Congo was interesting merely because it allowed a flexible response 
to the sudden rise in demand for coltan. It was certainly not regarded as a 
long-term source of stable supply. Indeed, long-term contracts were signed 
with other, more reliable partners in Australia and Brazil. Ultimately, the DR-
Congo remained as economically marginal as before, failing to attract serious 
long-term investment because of the country’s instability. Even to Belgium, 
which has important historical and economic ties with central Africa, the sig-
nificance of trade with the DRCongo has declined. Over a period of 40 years, 
the DRCongo has gone from being Belgium’s most important trading partner 
in the Third World to occupying a lowly 25th spot on this list. Moreover, Bel-
gium has not been replaced with other industrialised nations, which would ap-
pear to contradict the popular assertion that a ‘second scramble for Africa’ is 
taking place. While it is certainly true that many junior companies that were 
looking for a quick profit showed an interest in the DRCongo after the power 
transition in Kinshasa, most of these firms have since withdrawn without 
having invested in a country where ‘transaction costs’ for foreign companies 
are very substantial. In sum, we submit that the DRCongo’s economic crisis 
is due not so much to the greediness of international capitalism as to its lack 
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Conclusion
The international war in Central Africa can only be understood as the 
warp and weft of internal, regional and international factors. The long-term 
erosion of elite power and finance in some parts of Africa, occasioned by 
a changing geopolitical reality in the continent, has sparked divergent re-
sponses, ranging from state reconstruction in some countries to resistance, 
criminalisation and war in others. The latter response would appear to be 
most common in weak states with deteriorating infrastructures and rich natu-
ral resources that are extracted on a small scale by petty producers. Indeed, 
these are the countries that tend to fall prey to military-commercial groups 
and factions engaging in plunder and criminal activity. War and violence, 
then, seem to be viable paths and conscious strategies for concealing the fact 
that the elites are enriching themselves. Quite clearly, though, pursuing such 
a strategy is detrimental to the civilian populations, as it puts them at greater 
risk of death, displacement and hardship.
The economic involvement of the Rwandan military-commercial elite 
in the neighbouring country, exemplified by the coltan commodity chain, has 
been instrumental in pursuing different goals. The plunder in the RDC was 
concealed for more than three years and only acknowledged internationally 
after the publication of the UN panel’s reports. The ruthless military charac-
ter of the involvement permitted to extract more value added from the com-
modity chains than would be possible in times of peace or even compared to 
the territories under control from the government of Kinshasa and its allies. 
In the latter territories military extortion was less prominent and the normal 
competition between the commodity chain intermediaries could play such 
that value added was less siphoned off. The concealed character of the plun-
der in the east of the RDCongo permitted furthermore to enrich and reinforce 
those military personnel who had a stake in the Rwandan occupation. Third, 
the  Rwandan Government  could officially control and restrict its military 
budget to 3% of its GDP, demanded by the International Financial Institutions 
(IFI’s) , while at the same time continue its military intervention in the east 
of Congo. 
Of course the role of the international community by the choices made 
and its relative indifference to African affairs in the world has to a certain 
extent condoned the involvement of the Rwandan military-commercial in-
tervention in the east of Congo. The international community is however not 
a homogeneous- one purpose actor who would have a master plan as to the 
future of the continent in the world . The international political and donor 
community has been thoroughly divided on the Rwandan issue. Grosso modo 
one could say that the newcomers in Rwanda such as the US, UK and the 
Netherlands who weigh heavily on the decisions in the  IFI’s,  had , being also 
rightly shocked by the genocide, chosen to support the new government and 
the triumphant elite. This elite, who has closer ties to the Anglophone world, 
was not seen as part of the problem that has put the region in a blaze, but seen 26 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-07 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-07 • 27
as a possible solution for new enlightened leadership in the region. However 
the continuing war involvement, the conflict between Rwanda and Uganda 
and before all the fear that a dismantling of DRCongo could be opening up 
a box of Pandora, has incited the international community to also support 
the ongoing peace process in the Congo. The unprecedented speed in which 
Congo has been eligible to the funds of the IFI’s make an easy and unified 
statement  about  the  involvement  of  the  international  political  and  donor 
community in Rwanda and DRCongo difficult. Another favourite thesis on 
Africa’s instability and war causes is the role of international capital and the 
thesis that violence could be explained as  “ a second scramble for Africa” 
manipulating behind the scene the moves of the international political and 
donor community and thereby fuel the war in the DRCongo. Our commod-
ity chain of coltan was again instrumental in understanding better the role of 
international economic interests. 
 
Even if it is true that most value added is probably realised by interna-
tional traders, does that tie in with the hypothesis that war is being waged to 
foster the interests of international capital, with the Rwandan and Ugandan 
regimes serving as a local smokescreen? It is certainly true that some interna-
tional and regional traders (be it commercial or military) have benefited from 
the coltan rush and reaped most of the windfall profits. However, to the global 
tantalum processing industry, Eastern Congo was interesting merely because 
it allowed a flexible response to the sudden rise in demand for coltan. It was 
certainly not regarded as a long-term source of stable supply. Indeed, long-
term contracts were signed with other, more reliable partners in Australia and 
Brazil. Ultimately, the DRCongo remained as economically marginal as be-
fore, failing to attract serious long-term investment because of the country’s 
instability. While it is certainly true that many junior companies that were 
looking for a quick profit showed an interest in the DRCongo after the power 
transition in Kinshasa, most of these firms have since withdrawn without 
having invested in a country where ‘transaction costs’ for foreign companies 
are very substantial. In sum, we submit that the DRCongo’s economic crisis 
is due not so much to the greediness of international capitalism as to its lack 
of (serious) interest. Does the assertion that most value added is probably 
realised by international traders, and is not injected back into the Congolese 
economy, tie in with the hypothesis that war is being waged to foster the in-
terests of international capital, with the Rwandan and Ugandan regimes serv-
ing as a local smokescreen? It is certainly true that some international and 
regional traders (be it commercial or military) have benefited from the coltan 
rush and reaped most of the windfall profits. However, to the global tantalum 
processing industry, Eastern Congo was interesting merely because it allowed 
a flexible response to the sudden rise in demand for coltan. It was certainly 
not regarded as a long-term source of stable supply. Indeed, long-term con-
tracts were signed with other, more reliable partners in Australia and Brazil. 
Ultimately, the DRCongo remained as economically marginal as before, fail-
ing to attract serious long-term investment because of the country’s instabil-
ity. Even to Belgium, which has important historical and economic ties with 26 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-07 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-07 • 27
central Africa, the significance of trade with the DRCongo has declined. Over 
a period of 40 years, the DRCongo has gone from being Belgium’s most im-
portant trading partner in the Third World to occupying a lowly 25th spot on 
this list. Moreover, Belgium has not been replaced with other industrialised 
nations, which would appear to contradict the popular assertion
that a ‘second scramble for Africa’ is taking place. While it is certainly 
true that many junior companies that were looking for a quick profit showed 
an interest in the DRCongo after the power transition in Kinshasa, most of 
these firms have since withdrawn without having invested in a country where 
‘transaction costs’ for foreign companies are very substantial. In sum, we sub-
mit that the DRCongo’s economic crisis is due not so much to the greediness 
of international capitalism as to its lack of (serious) interest. 28 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-07 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-07 • 29
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